University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Constitutional Commentary

1992

"Terminator 2 1/2'': The Constitution in an
Alternate World.
Daniel A. Farber

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Farber, Daniel A., ""Terminator 2 1/2'': The Constitution in an Alternate World." (1992). Constitutional Commentary. 191.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm/191

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Constitutional
Commentary collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

"TERMINATOR 2 1/2": THE CONSTITUTION
IN AN ALTERNATE WORLD
Daniel A. Farber*
[The computer] was so certain that time displacement could save it
from defeat that it had sent two terminators through: one in 1984,
and one now. . . . Remove two human beings like pieces out of a
puzzle, hoping the new historical pattern that emerged after will be
more in its favor. Editing the past to change its present.

Randall Frakes, Terminator 2:
Judgment Day 1561
LEITER FROM THOMAS JEFFERSON TO JOHN ADAMS,
JULY

2, 1826

... As the End approaches, old friend, I cannot help but reflect
on the mysterious Death of mister Madison. In the years that have
gone by since that day, I have collected and assayed the testimony
of many of the Witnesses. There was much Confusion. Several
speake of a Man all dressed in leather and with Dark eye glasses of
a forbidding aspect. Others claim to have seen feats of amazing
Strengthe, and say that he did lift a horse to clear a path to our
Friend. Yet Men are prone to imagine Horrors and among those
who live in Cities the tendency to alarms and panic is great indeed.
All that we can know for fact is that a man jumped from the crowd
and fired many bullets into the helpless figure of our Friend.
Thus was his corporeal existence Terminated. How or why
will never be knowne. Little wonder that Congress soon removed
itself from the dangers and Crimes of New York to a safer seat of
Government.
• Henry J. Fletcher Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. Thanks are due to
Dianne Farber, Phil Frickey, Mike Paulsen, and Suzanna Sherry for helpful comments.
Non-historians should note that certain bill of attainder cases-Garland, Missouri v.
Cummings, and United States v. Brown-are described or quoted in the text without any
modification of the "real" versions. The same is true of Chisholm v. Georgia and of the
description of ante-bellum views of the Privileges and Immunities Clause.
This article is dedicated to the post-contemporary philosopher Jean-Luc Picard.
I. Bantam Books, 1991.
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Poor Jemmy! If only he had lived. How History would have
been different we cannot know in Detail but we cannot doubt.

•••• ••••••••
ANNALS OF CONGRESS, JUNE 8, 1789
THE SPEAKER addressed the House concerning the death of
the Honorable Representative from Virginia, Mr. James Madison.
MR. SHERMAN We must all mourn the passing of one of the
first Architects of our Nation. His role in the construction of our
constitution is known to all present. We must carry on in the spirit
in which he set forth.
If Mr. Madison had lived, he planned today to request that the
House go into a Committee of the Whole to consider amendments
to that document, or that a select Committee be appointed to consider the Matter. As he was wont to say, such amendments may on
the whole have a salutary effect, and he was of the view that it
would be highly political and proper in itself for the tranquility of
the public mind that we should offer some such protections to be
incorporated into the system of government. He had written a brief
draft of these amendments, which I have brought with me today for
the purpose of moving that the House refer them to the Committee
of the Whole.
ELBRIDGE GERRY With the greatest of respect to the late
Member, urgent business faces this House regarding the revenues
and government of the United States. In the original drafting of the
Constitution Mr. Madison built better than perhaps even he knew,
and to amend the building in haste is no fit tribute to the original
architect who designed the plans. I move that the main motion be
laid upon the table.
Upon a taking of the ayes and nays, the ayes had it, and the
motion was laid upon the table:

• • •• ••••• •••
DANIEL FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A META-HISTORY OF
THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1990), pp. 230-231.
Madison's death was a turning point. His bereft widow, lacking other resources, opened a bakery with the assistance of friends,
and became famous as the creator of the confections for children
that are known by her name even today. Spurred on by popular
revulsion at his death, the Jeffersonians were successful in organiz-
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ing a new party, and seized power from the Federalists in the Presidential election of 1801.
With the fateful death of Madison, the one real opportunity for
a national bill of rights passed. The Federalists remained unconvinced of its necessity, insisting as they always had that the limited
powers of the new government would not extend to the violation of
individual rights. For the Anti-Federalists, the demand for a bill of
rights had never been much more than a makeweight. Perhaps, if
Madison had lived, he would have felt bound by his own promises
to promote the passage of a bill of rights. Ironically, his death made
a bill of rights less likely than ever. Many assumed that his unknown assailant was an embittered opponent of the Constitution.
In the aftermath of his mysterious death, Madison became known
as the "Martyr of the Constitution." Any change in the original
document-which was often referred to as "our Perfect Constitution"-was subject to popular attack as an affront to the memory of
the Martyr.
As the years went by, and the Constitution remained unamended, the very idea of amending the Constitution became more
and more unthinkable. When the Supreme Court shocked the nation in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), by holding
that an individual could sue a state in federal court, there was much
muttering about a constitutional amendment, but there was even
greater support for impeachment of the Justices. The Court hastily
granted rehearing and overruled its prior decision. The one aspect
of Chisholm to have permanent effect was its reliance on the Preamble (2 Dall. at 464, 474-76), which might otherwise have been dismissed as "window dressing."
Even in the aftermath of the Civil War, the few amendments
proposed by Radical Republicans were unsuccessful. A proposed
amendment to abolish slavery foundered, as Congress preferred to
rely on the War Power and Guarantee clauses of the Constitution as
the basis for reconstructing the South. The majority of Republicans
believed amendments to be unnecessary. They agreed with Senator
Trumbull that the Privileges and Immunities clause of Article IV
already established that "the rights of a citizen of the United States
were certain great fundamental rights, such as the right to life, to
liberty, and to avail one's self of all the laws passed for the benefit of
the citizen to enable him to enforce his rights." Cong. Globe, 39th
Cong., 1st Sess. 600 (1866).
If Madison had lived, things might have been very different.
As it is, to this day, the document stands just as it did at the end of
the summer of 1787.
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JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES (1820)
Article III of the Constitution, section 2, paragraph 3, states
that "The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment,
shall be by Jury." To the uneducated sense of the lay person, this
might seem only a matter of procedure at Trial. But those who
were responsible for its adoption understood it differently, as would
all who know the sorry history of English state trials. What avails
it to have a jury at the trial, if the whole matter be settled by a
confession twisted from the unwilling defendant by torture or
threat? The true trial would then take place, not before the jury,
but in the dark interrogation room of the gaol. Even in the case of
treason, the Framers in their wisdom required in Article III, section
3, clause 1, that any conviction not grounded on the evidence of two
witnesses be based on "Confession in Open Court," so as to guard
against the destruction of the right to jury trial through secret interrogation of the prisoner. In cases less grave, an out-of-court confession may be admitted, but only if made without coercion; otherwise,
the right to jury trial would be negated. And so also, if the matter
be settled by papers seized from the defendant without any proper
cause, or if the defendant be denied the use of counsel with whom to
address the jury, or the right to bring witnesses before the jury and
to question those appearing against him, so that the jury is denied
knowledge of his cause. True trial by jury means trial according to
the accustomed course of common law, with the rights of procedure
that have been the due process of our law. So it has been understood since Magna Carta, and so it was understood by the founders
of our Nation. For their solemn pledge was that the Constitution
contained within it the rights of free citizens, so that the power of
the government was limited by those inherent and inalienable
rights.

•••••• ••••••
STRA UDER V. WEST VIRGINIA

100 u.s. 303 (1880)
[Strauder, a black defendant, was convicted of murder by a jury
from which blacks were excluded under state law. The issue before
the Court was the constitutionality of the state statute.]
JUSTICE STRONG delivered the opinion of the Court.

•••

The defendant argues that the statute removing members of
the negro race from jurors is a bill of attainder. We are constrained
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to agree. In Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866), we
held unconstitutional a state law that required priests to take an
oath that they had never aided the late rebellion. The Court explained the scope of the clause:
The deprivation of any rights, civil or political, previously enjoyed, may be punishment, the circumstances attending and the
causes of the deprivation determining this fact. Disqualification
from office may be punishment, as in cases of convictions upon
impeachment. Disqualification from the pursuits of a lawful avocation, or from positions of trust, or from the privilege of appearing in the courts, or acting as an executor, administrator, or
guardian, may also, and often has been, imposed as punishment.
71 U.S. at 320.

In Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866), we held that
even Congress could not require a similar loyalty oath by attorneys
practicing in the federal courts. We have no doubt that such an
oath could never be required of jurors. If, then, it is clearly unconstitutional to deprive a person by statute of fundamental rights on
the basis of their past misconduct, how much more unconstitutional
it must be where the basis of denial is not any conduct of their own,
but only the circumstances of birth.
The appellee argues that disabilities based on race cannot be
bills of attainder since slavery was itself contemplated in the Constitution. But slavery, when it existed, was based on the lack of citizenship of the slaves. Lacking legal personhood, they could not
enjoy the protection of the rights granted by the Constitution to
others. Congress, in the exercise of its power in Article I, sec. 8,
clause 4, to establish uniform laws of naturalization, has made citizens of all those unfortunates who were formerly held as slaves.
Having become citizens, they are now entitled to the full protection
of the Constitution, and can no more be subjected to bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, or impairments of contract, than any other
citizens. And those who were not slaves themselves but only children of slaves must in the future have the full rights of citizens, of
which not even Congress could deprive them, for under Article III,
section 3, even conviction for Treason, let alone anything else, can
not "work Corruption of Blood." All distinctions based on ancestry are wholly repugnant to the Constitution, which bans not only
punishment of the son for the sins of the father, but also elevation
through any title of nobility.
The legislature in this case has imposed a grave disability and
stigma, not on those who have been adjudicated to have violated
some previously enacted statute, but on a class singled out by the

64

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 9:59

legislature for disapproval. For the legislature to attaint an entire
race is as much if not more a violation of the clause as for the legislature to attaint a named individual or a group such as the supporters of the rebellion. This Court, which has defended even the rights
of those who sought to overthrow the Constitution in the name of
slavery, must stand steadfast against violations of the rights of those
whom the late rebels sought to hold in chains.

•••• ••••••••
THOMAS COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS (1868), pp. 167-68.

The protection of property being, as the Framers well understood from their study of Locke, one of the foundations of legitimate government, it cannot be thought that the right of property
would be left unguarded by the Constitution. As the Dartmouth
College case established, the Constitutional protection against impairment of the obligation of contract is not limited to private debts,
though that may have been the concern that originally prompted
the drafting of the clause. Rather, the clause extends to all agreements made by the states, whether in the form of agreements for the
repayment of money, corporate charters, or grants of property.
Common sense concurs that the clause cannot be limited to
any particular legal form of undertaking by the state. It would be of
little use to have a constitution that protected against a modification
of the charter of Dartmouth College, if the state could have
achieved the same goal by seizing all of the property of the college
without compensation, and then remitting the property to a newly
chartered corporation more agreeable to the legislature. Implicit in
every grant of property by or under state law is the undertaking of
the state to respect the ownership of that property. That undertaking is, of course, subject to the police power where the use of property would be contrary to the public health, welfare, or morals, and
it leaves the state with the power to purchase the property over the
owner's objections at fair market price. But whether or not the
state has explicitly so stated, it can never be presumed to have reserved the power to arbitrarily destroy property or eliminate its
value. It is the office of the Contract Clause to protect that implicit
understanding.
As the great Chancellor Kent understood, legislation in civil
society must be based on the twin principles deriving from the limits
on the temporal jurisdiction of the legislature: First, that which was
neither a crime nor a basis for culpability when the act was done
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cannot be made so afterward; and second, property once lawfully
gained cannot afterwards be arbitrarily denied. These fundamental
principles need not be explicitly stated to remain valid, but the Contract Clause is an implicit ratification of them.

••••••••••• •
LOCHNER V. NEW YORK

198

u.s. 45 (1905)

[A New York statute prohibited the employment of bakery employees for more than 10 hours a day or 60 hours a week. The statute
was attacked as a violation of the Contract Clause and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV.]
JUSTICE PECKHAM delivered the opinion of the Court.

•••

The statute necessarily interferes with the right of contract between the employer and employees. As to all employment relationships already in existence it relieves the employees of their
obligation to perform the hours of service required by their contract; we need not consider in the present case whether it also impairs an implicit undertaking of the state to uphold the liberty of its
citizens. As to even future employment relationships, it deprives
the individual of one of the great "privileges and immunities of citizens of the Several states." For that clause has long been understood to encompass the fundamental rights of free citizens. In
Cor:field v. Coryell, 6 Fed. Cas. 546, 551-52 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823),
Justice Washington said that this clause included "those privileges
and immunities which are, in their nature, fundamental; which belong, of right, to the citizens of all free governments; and which
have, at all times, been enjoyed by the citizens of the several states."
Among those rights were "Protection by the government; the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety;
subject nevertheless to such restraints as the government may justly
prescribe for the general good of the whole." The right to pursue a
lawful occupation as one sees fit, and to enter into a contract with
one's employer, is thus such a fundamental right. The question
then, is whether the power of police described in that last clause
provides a justification for the statute before us.
[The Court held that the purported health justification for the
statute was specious.]
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GITLOW V. NEW YORK

268

u.s.

652 (1925)

[The defendant was convicted of criminal anarchy. The majority
held that he was properly convicted, inasmuch as he had gone beyond abstract academic discussion of revolution and had advocated
the overthrow of the government.]
JusTICE HOLMES, dissenting. Mr. Justice Brandeis and I are of the
opinion that this judgment should be reversed. The general principle of free speech, it seems to me, must be taken to be included in
the privileges and immunities clause of Article IV, in view of the
scope that has been given to the word "immunities" as used there.
[Holmes here cited Lochner and Corfield.] Even as to the federal
government, the Framers took care to cabin the national power to
punish sedition. The Constitution allows Congress to punish treason only if there are two witnesses to an overt act. That prohibition
would be a nullity if anything less than a criminal attempt to overthrow the government could be punished, for Congress could then
call Treason by another name and define the offense as it chose.
To rise beyond mere preparation to the level of a punishable
attempt, an act must give rise to a clear and present danger of harm.
••• If what I think the correct test is applied, it is manifest that
there was no present danger of an attempt to overthrow the government by force on the part of the admittedly small minority who
shared the defendant's views. It is said that this manifesto was
more than a theory, it was an incitement. Every idea is an incitement. It offers itself for belief, and if believed it is acted on unless
some other belief outweighs it or some failure of energy stifles the
movement at its birth. The only difference between the expression
of an opinion and an incitement in the narrower sense is the
speaker's enthusiasm for the result. Eloquence may set fire to reason. But whatever may be thought of the redundant discourse
before us it had no chance of starting a present conflagration.

• •••••••••••
EVERSON V. BOARD OF EDUCATION

330

u.s.

1 (1947)

[This case involved a state law providing free bus transportation for
children at parochial schools.]
JusTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.

•••

A large proportion of the early settlers of this country came
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here from Europe to escape the bondage of laws which compelled
them to support and attend government-favored churches. The
centuries immediately before and contemporaneous with the colonization of America had been filled with turmoil, civil strife, and persecutions, generated in large part by established sects determined to
maintain their absolute political and religious supremacy. * * *
These practices of the old world were transplanted to and began to thrive in the soil of the new America. * * * They became so
commonplace as to shock the freedom-loving colonials into a feeling of abhorrence. [Justice Black then discussed the controversy in
Virginia in 1785-86, in which Jefferson and Madison led the fight
for religious freedom, and Madison wrote his famous Remonstrance
against the law.]
This Court has previously recognized that the provisions of the
Constitution, in the drafting and adoption of which Madison played
such a leading role, were intended to provide the same protection
against governmental intrusion as the Virginia statute. That is undoubtedly what the "martyr of the Constitution" meant by the
"blessings of liberty" in the Preamble, and why all religious tests for
office were forever banned in Article VI, section 3. The separation
of church and state was also clearly a part of the "republican" form
of government guaranteed the states, by Article IV, section 4. In
previous cases, this Court has recognized that a republican government is necessarily a non-theocratic government, and that such a
government could neither establish a religion nor impair the free
exercise of religion.
The "republican form of government" clause means at least
this: No state can set up a church. Nor can it pass laws which aid
one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.
And what the states cannot do under that Clause, the federal government is also without power to do under Article I, for as the supporters of the Constitution made clear, the enumerated powers of
the government did not extend to regulation of the press or to the
subject of religion.

************
BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION

347

u.s. 483 (1954)

[This opinion concerns four cases from Kansas, South Carolina,
Virginia, and Delaware, in which school segregation laws had been
challenged.]
CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court.
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•••
In the first cases in this Court after the civil war construing the
Bill of Attainder Clause, the Court interpreted it as proscribing all
state-imposed discriminations against the Negro race. [The Court
here cited Strauder.] The doctrine of "separate but equal" did not
make its appearance in this Court until 1896 in Plessy v. Ferguson,
involving not education but transportation. • • •
In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to
1789, when the Constitution was adopted, or even to 1896 when
Plessy was written. We must consider public education in the light
of its full development and its present place in American life
throughout the Nation. Only in this way can it be determined if
segregation in public schools imposes a bill of attainder on these
plaintiffs. • • •
We come then to the question presented: Does segregation of
children in public schools solely on the basis of race ... deprive the
children of the minority group of equal educational opportunities?
We believe that it does. • • • To separate them from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a
feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may
affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.
Whatever may have been true when P/essy was decided, today it is
clear that segregation imposes a disability and a stigma on the affected class, and therefore violates the constitutional prohibition on
state bills of attainder.
(In a companion case, Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954),
the Court held that segregation within the District of Columbia violated the bill of attainder clause of Article I, section 9, which applies
to the federal government rather than the states.]

••••••••••• •
DANIEL FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A META-HISTORY OF
THE AMERICAN CoNSTITUTION (1990), pp. 256-57.

The climax of economic libertarianism occurred in the early
1930s, when the Court struck down important New Deal legislation. President Roosevelt then proposed to "pack" the Court with
additional appointees. Although his proposal was rejected by Congress, his view of the Constitution triumphed, first because of a
switch in the views of a key justice and then because of new appointments. As a result, for many years the Court almost entirely
withdrew from judicial review of economic regulations. It also left
Congress free to regulate areas previously left to the States. In the
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famous footnote 4 of Carolene Products, the Court drew a distinction between ordinary legislation and that contravening the rights
of "discrete and insular" minorities, violating specific constitutional
guarantees, or impairing the democratic process. That distinction
was to prove fruitful in the years ahead.
Gradually, the Court began to assume a new role as the guardian of other individual rights, especially as against state governments. As early as the case of Palko v. Connecticut, the Court had
held that the privileges and immunities clause incorporated those
rights inherent in ordered liberty, relying in part on the intent of the
Framers to "establish Justice," in the words of the Preamble. However, the Court rejected Justice Black's argument that specific protections-such as the Article III right to jury trial-were
"incorporated" or "transplanted" into the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV.
Justice Black was never successful in selling his view of total
transplantation, but the Warren Court held that the jury trial right
was itself fundamental. This set the stage for the "transplantation"
doctrine, under which various decisions construing the federal right
to a jury trial were transplanted as interpretations of the Privileges
and Immunities Clause of Article IV. Those rights included all of
the various non-adversarial, inquisitorial methods of proof such as
coerc-ed confessions (construed broadly in Miranda v. Arizona to include any confession unaccompanied by specified warnings), unreasonable searches (a violation of the jury trial right under Mapp v.
Ohio), and the assistance of counsel, at government expense if necessary (Gideon v. Wainwright).
Carolene Products, with its emphasis on freeing the channels of
majority rule, naturally called to mind the mandate of the Guarantee Clause. Early decisions by the Stone Court made it clear that
the obligation of "the United States" to "guarantee to every State in
this Union a Republican Form of Government" was binding on the
Courts as well as on the political branches. Only as to the question
of identifying the legitimate state government, which had early on
been held to be a political question, were the courts powerless.
In a series of cases involving the State of Texas, the Court
made it clear that disenfranchisement of racial groups was incompatible with "our society's evolving view of the nature of republican
government." In the capstone of these cases, the so-called Jaybirds
Case, the Court held that a de facto delegation of electoral power to
a private group did not constitute a republican form of government.
The Warren Court made even more expansive use of the
clause. In the famous one-person, one-vote decisions, it held that
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malapportionment was unrepublican and therefore unconstitutional. It upheld the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and subsequent
amendments as Congressional implementations of the clause.
Building on the Holmes and Brandeis dissents of an earlier era,
the Warren Court also aggressively protected freedom of expression. As Justice Cardozo once said, this freedom is as much "instinct within the entire document" as found in any particular
provision. Caro/ene Products made clear that free expression on
political matters is inherent in the scheme of democratic majority
rule established by the Constitution, which could hardly function if
the public were unable to discuss political matters.
Other provisions of the Constitution have also been invoked in
support of free speech. For example, as early as Near v. Minnesota,
the Court held that a prior restraint on speech violated the right to
jury trial found in Article III and transplanted by the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV. Historically, one key function of
jury trials was to protect dissenters, and that function would be critically undermined if courts were allowed to use their equitable powers to suppress speech.
The Privileges and Immunities Clause--once characterized by
Justice Holmes as "the last resort of constitutional argument"-has
also been utilized to protect freedom of speech. In United States v.
Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965), the Court struck down a statute making it a crime for a member of the Communist Party to be a labor
union officer. Chief Justice Warren's opinion remains today as a
leading discussion of the Bill of Attainder Clause. Rejecting the
argument that the statute was not a bill of attainder because it affected so large a group, the Court said "the decisions of this Court,
as well as the historical background of the Bill of Attainder Clause,
make it crystal clear that these are distinctions without a difference." Quoting Alexander Hamilton, the Court said:
Nothing is more common than for a free people, in times of heat
and violence, to gratify momentary passions, by letting into the
government principles and precedents which afterwards prove
fatal to themselves.... If the legislature can disenfranchise any
number of citizens at pleasure by general descriptions, it may
soon confine all the votes to a small number of partisans, and
establish an aristocracy or oligarachy; if it may banish at discretion all those whom particular circumstances render obnoxious,
without hearing or trial, no man can be safe, nor know when he
may be the innocent victim of a prevailing faction. The name of
liberty applied to such a government, would be a mockery of
common sense. [381 U.S. at 444].
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Thus, the Court said, "the Bill of Attainder Clause reflected the
Framers' belief that the Legislative Branch is not so well suited as
politically independent judges and juries to the task of ruling on the
blameworthiness of . . . specific persons."
Recently, conservatives have attacked many of these decisions
as unwarrantedly "creative" readings of the Constitutional text. In
response, some liberals have invoked the idea of a "living Constitution," arguing that since amending the Constitution has proved
completely impossible, only judicial creativity can keep the Constitution in tune with changing times. Other liberals rely on the original intent of the Framers. The Federalists made it clear, they argue,
that no bill of rights was required because the federal power lacked
the power to invade fundamental individual rights. Thus, even
what seem to be broad grants of power-such as the power of general legislation in the District of Columbia-must be seen as carrying inherent limitations. After all, the individuals ratifying the
Constitution could hardly have believed that they were giving the
new government power to reenact such ancient practices as burning
religious dissenters at the stake, even within the seat of government.
Conservatives, on the other hand, point to what they see as the lack
of textual support for modern judicial decisions. They also argue
that whatever limits the Framers may have meant to impose on the
federal government implicitly, they imposed only a few very specific
limitations on the states.
In response, some scholars have suggested that constitutional
law has resulted from a creative interplay of history, text, and
evolving social norms. Ultimately, practical reason mediates between the anchoring tendencies of text and history, and the dynamic pull of the legal system's aspiration toward justice.
In the meantime, some critical legal scholars argue that the
language and history of the Constitution have little to do with the
outcomes of cases. As one critical legal scholar has argued:
Perhaps more than any area of the law, constitutional law reveals
the indeterminacy of liberal legal thought. While purporting
merely to rely on the rules laid down in the Constitution, the
open texture of Constitutional language has given the Court free
rein to create doctrinal results inspired more by ideology than by
history or text. The plasticity of the legal materials allows them
to be molded toward any politically desired goal.

On the other hand, Morris Zapp, a prominent literary theorist, argues that the critical scholars are right about the indeterminacy of
texts but wrong about the implications:
A text means nothing without a reader. It means different things
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to different readers. So far, the Crits are right. But no reader
simply decides what the text means. Consider the broad protection of individual rights, which generations of judges have found
in the Privileges and Immunities Clause and the Bill of Attainder
Clause. Other readers, in other contexts, might have read these
as no more than technicalities. Our judges, from almost the beginning, read them as foundations of individual liberty. But this
does not mean that they decided how to read these clauses, as if
they had a menu of interpretations to choose from. They had to
read those clauses from their own standpoint, from the standpoint of American lawyers, trained in a certain commonlaw tradition in which the line between technicalities and fundamentals
has never been clear to begin with. They read the Constitution to
embody a concept of limited government and individual freedom.
How else could they have read it, being who they were? What
choice did they have? What other interpretation could they have
found? There was never any moment when they were free to
choose.

••••••••• •••
ROE V. WADE

410

u.s.

113 (1973)

[The issue before the Court was the constitutionality of the Texas
abortion law, which prohibited all abortions except those performed
to save the life of the mother.]
JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.

•••

The Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy. But the Court bas recognized that a right of personal privacy,
or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under
the Constitution. In varying contexts, the Court or individual Justices have, indeed, found at least the roots of that right in the jury
trial clause and its implied prohibition of unreasonable searches,
Stanley v. Georgia; in the Preamble's language concerning the Blessings of Liberty; in the concept of liberty guaranteed by the privileges and immunities clause of article IV, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923); in the special protection granted by the contract
clause to consensual relationships such as marriage, Loving v. Virginia; in the bill of attainder clause, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535 (1942); and in the penumbras of all these clauses, Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). These decisions make it clear
that only personal rights that can be deemed "fundamental" or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" [Palko] are included in the
guarantee of personal privacy. They also make it clear that the
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right has some extension to activities relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and
education.
This right of privacy, whether it be found in the Privilege and
Immunity Clause's concept of personal liberty, as we feel it is, or as
the District Court determined, in the Preamble, is broad enough to
encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy. * * *

************
"The Past is Prologue."

